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ABSTRACT 
Large scale outages on real-world critical infrastructures (CIs), although infrequent, are increasingly 
disastrous to our society. In this paper, we are primarily concerned with power transmission networks 
and we consider the problem of allocation of generation to distributors by rewiring links under the 
objectives of maximizing network resilience to cascading failure and minimizing investment costs. 
The combinatorial multi-objective optimization is carried out by a non-dominated sorting binary 
differential evolution (NSBDE) algorithm. For each generators-distributors connection pattern 
considered in the NSBDE search, a computationally-cheap, topological model of failure cascading in a 
complex network (named, the Motter-Lai (ML) model) is used to simulate and quantify network 
resilience to cascading failures initiated by targeted attacks. The results on the 400kV French power 
transmission network case study show that the proposed method allows to identify optimal patterns of 
generators-distributors connection which improve cascading resilience at an acceptable cost. 
To verify the realistic character of the results obtained by the NSBDE with embedded ML topological 
model, a more realistic but also more computationally-expensive model of cascading failures is 
adopted, based on optimal power flow (namely, the ORNL-Pserc-Alaska (OPA) model). The 
consistent results between the two models provide impetus for the use of topological, complex 
network theory models for analysis and optimization of large infrastructures against cascading failure 
with the advantages of simplicity, scalability and low computational cost. 
KEY WORDS: critical infrastructure, power transmission network, cascading failures, complex 
network theory model, power flow model, optimization 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Our modern society has come to depend on large-scale critical infrastructures (CIs) to deliver 
resources and services to consumers and businesses in an efficient manner. These CIs are complex 
networks of interconnected functional and structural elements. Large scale outages on these real-world 
complex networks, although infrequent, are increasingly disastrous to society, with estimates of direct 
costs up to billions of dollars and inestimable indirect costs. Typical examples include blackouts in 
power transmission networks (1-3), financial bankruptcy (4), telecommunication outages (5), and 
catastrophic failures in socio-economic systems (6-7). 
Cascading failures are initiated typically when a small part of the system fails for some reasons, and 
the load on that part (i.e. the flow passing through it) must be redistributed to other parts in the system. 
This redistribution may cause other components to exceed their capacity causing them also to fail. 
Hence, the number of failed or stressed components increases, propagating throughout the network. In 
particularly serious cases, the entire network is affected. Research regarding modeling, prediction and 
mitigation of cascading failures in CIs, whereby small initial disturbances may propagate through the 
whole infrastructure system, has addressed the problem in different ways (4-6, 8-13).  
Albert et al. (14) demonstrated that the vulnerability of modern infrastructure networks (e.g., power 
transmission networks) is inherent to their structure. Thadakamalla (15) revealed that the topology of a 
supply infrastructure has great impact on its resilience. Then, much attention has been paid in recent 
years in the direction of network topology optimization, with the purpose of achieving desired targets 
of reliability and/or resilience (16-19, 26).  Shao et al. (17) proposed a shrinking and searching algorithm to 
maximize the reliability of a distributed access network with constrained total cost; however, the 
intense computational cost for evaluating network reliability prohibits the application of the model to 
large size networks. Gutfraind (18) introduced a multi-objective optimization method for constructing 
cascade resilient networks based on the structure of terrorist networks. Besides, Newth et al. (19) used a 
modified Metropolis evolutionary algorithm to evolve failure resilient networks with the objective of 
maximizing the average network efficiency. Cadini et al. (20) investigated the problem of optimizing 
the transmission reliability efficiency of an existing power transmission network with least cost by 
adding new connection links. 
In practical cases, the cost of knocking down an existing network and reconstructing it from scratch is 
prohibitive, especially for CIs like the power transmission network. A more practicable alternative is 
to reconfigure parts of the network topology, e.g. by reallocation of the links which connect 
production facilities to consumers.  
The primary objective of this paper is to propose a methodology for optimal allocation of the links 
connecting generators and distributors in a power transmission network for obtaining high resilience to 
cascading failures while keeping the investment costs low. Formulated as a large-scale, nonlinear and 
combinatorial multi-objective optimization problem, the facility allocation problem is solved by an 
evolutionary method, i.e., the non-dominated sorting binary differential evolution (NSBDE) algorithm 
(21, 22)
.  
The search by the NSBDE requires also: (i) the construction of a model to describe the cascading 
failure process in the network of interest, and (ii) the repeated evaluation of the model for every 
possible generators-distributors configuration proposed by the algorithm during the search. With 
respect to the model, two approaches are typically considered in the analysis of power transmission 
systems: complex network theory models, such as the Motter-Lai (ML) model (8, 9) and artificial power 
flow models, such as the ORNL-Pserc-Alaska (OPA) model (10-12). These approaches provide different 
tradeoffs between the (relatively low) computational cost associated to the model evaluation (allowing 
real-time applications to large scale power grids) and the (high) level of detail in the system 
description (including physical characteristics and power flows constraints), respectively. 
The OPA model seeks to faithfully describe the dispatching dynamics of the power flows during the 
evolution of the failure propagation following the initial disturbances, by explicitly incorporating the 
standard DC power flow equations and minimizing generation cost and load shedding (11). Embracing 
this more physical description and solving the constrained linear optimization functions associated to 
the model, result in a significant increase in the computational burden, rendering its application 
extremely difficult for realistic networks with large number of elements (13).  
For these reasons, topological models based on complex network theory (e.g. the ML model) have 
emerged in recent years (8, 9, 23-25). In particular, the ML model is a relatively simple and abstract model 
relying on the resemblance of complex networks to electrical infrastructure systems (in terms of graph 
theory). It has the advantage of modelling cascading dynamics with few parameters, so that its 
application to realistic, large-scale networks is feasible and certainly more readily than OPA (23). 
However, ML abstracts the power flow laws and constraints of the electrical system. Inevitably, then, 
it cannot provide direct physical measures of blackout size, but rather abstract measures such as 
efficiency loss. This has posed questions on whether or not it is adequate in practice, due to its abstract 
nature, although it has been recognized to offer a new and interesting perspective on the study of 
cascading failures on power grids (24).  
It is worth mentioning that studies tackling the problem of validation of network-centric approaches 
are few in literature. Some studies (13, 24) have provided qualitative comparisons between complex 
network theory models and power flow models – identifying similarities and differences, and 
evaluating advantages and disadvantages. Most recently, Correa and Yusta (26) conclude on the 
appropriateness of graph theory techniques for the assessment of electric network vulnerability by 
means of comparisons between physical power flow models and scale-free graph statistic indexes. 
Cupac et al. (27) have presented a method to quantitatively compare a network-centric model (CLM) 
and the power flow model OPA, finding that the CLM model exhibits overall properties which are 
consistent with the more realistic OPA fast-scale model. On the other hand, Fitzmaurice et al. (40) find 
that the topological nearest neighbor cascading failure model (namely, the TC model) shows different 
characteristics from other two Kirchhoff models (namely, LD and QSS). Hines et al. (41) conclude that 
evaluating vulnerability in power networks using purely topological metrics may be misleading under 
some circumstances. Furthermore, Cotilla-Sanchez et al. (42) propose a new method for representing 
electrical structure using electrical distances rather than geographic connections.  
In the present paper, we embrace the topological ML cascading failure model and embed it in the 
NSBDE for optimally solving the problem of generators-distributors link allocation. For 
exemplification, we apply the method to the 400 kV French power transmission network, under the 
objectives of maximizing network resilience to cascading failures and minimizing investment costs (28). 
We, then, tackle the problem of realistic significance of the results that can be obtained with the 
proposed methodology. For this reason, the OPA is performed on the optimal network topologies 
found. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study addressing the validation of optimization 
based on topological cascade model (namely, the ML model), by applying a more realistic power flow 
model (namely, the OPA model).  
The optimization problem considered is addressing the network topology and in the specific case study 
we have considered for exemplification purpose the topology abstracted from the 400kV French 
power grid. In the abstraction, any station (generator, transmission/distribution substation) is regarded 
as one individual topological node in the network model, whereas the internal structure and functional 
logic of the specific station are ignored. Then, how the transmission lines interconnect with lower 
voltage networks has not been considered in this study, similar to what has been done in prior studies 
on these analyses (18-20). The purpose of performing these analyses in this way is to leverage the 
simplicity and low computational cost of the topological (cascading failure) model used within the 
(evolutionary) network optimization, which otherwise would be very costly. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the ML and OPA 
cascading failure models in detail. We, then, formulate the multi-objective optimization problem 
taking investment costs and failure resilience into account in Section 3. Section 4 unveils the detailed 
procedure of the proposed NSBDE algorithm. Section 5 illustrates the French 400kV power 
transmission network case study and the analysis and evaluation of the results. Discussion and 
conclusion are drawn in Section 6. 
2 CASCADING FAILURE MODELS CONSIDERED IN THIS WORK 
Modelling the dynamic evolution of system-wide cascading failure processes poses a number of 
challenges due to the diversity of mechanisms which can initiate the initial failure and influence the 
subsequent propagation of breakdowns in the power system (13). Various cascading failure models have 
been proposed; these can be divided into two main categories: those based on complex network theory 
analysis and those using power flow analysis, often including optimal economic power dispatch after 
each failure in the propagation, e.g., by linear optimal power flow (OPF) (27). 
Complex network theory models, including the ML model adopted in this work and described in 
Section 2.1 below, abstract the representation of a power grid as a graph and then study the 
connectivity characteristics, the propagation mechanisms through the graph connections and their 
relationships. They typically consider flows of discrete packets that are injected and removed from all 
nodes and follow least distance paths, and the importance of links or nodes is measured by 
“betweenness”, which is proportional to the number of least distance paths through the link or node (13). 
Among these, the ML model is the widely used and relatively simple one. These types of models have 
proved to provide a good understanding of the specific grid dynamics of cascading failures (30). 
However, in these models the assumptions only abstract the real loading of the components and the 
flow distribution through the connections. For this reason, it is necessary to ascertain the 
meaningfulness of the results for real electrical infrastructures.  
Power flow models, on the contrary, are based on realistic power flow equations to describe the flow 
dispatching dynamics and failure evolution after the initial disturbances in the power grid. The OPA 
model, which is the most commonly used of this type of models, is introduced in Section 2.2 below 
and is based on the linearized or DC power flow approximation, which has been proved to be able to 
give a good approximation of active power flows in the network (29). Another power flow model is the 
CASCADE model (43), though it is considered ‘‘too simple’’ in that it ‘‘disregards the system structure, 
neglects the times between adjacent failures and generation adaptation during failure’’ (44). 
2.1. The ML model 
The ML model has been proposed by Motter and Lai (8), with extensions to differentiate generators and 
loads (23). The power transmission network is represented as an undirected graph Q with a set of N 
nodes representing NG generators and ND loads representing distribution substations, interconnected by 
a set of edges representing transmission lines. The structure of the network is identified by an  ×  
interaction matrix , whose element  is 0 if node  and  are not connected directly; otherwise it is 
assigned 1 for an unweighted network or a numerical value between  and	 for a weighted network. 
The ML model assumes that at each time step, one unit of the relevant quantity (electrical flow for 
power grids) is exchanged between every pair of generator and distributor nodes, and transmitted 
along the shortest path connecting them. The flow at one node is, then, the number of shortest paths 
passing through it. More precisely, the flow 
  passing through node k is quantified by the node 
betweenness calculated as the fraction of the generator-distributor shortest paths passing through that 
node: 

 = ∑ ()∈,∈,                                             (1) 
where  is the number of shortest paths between generator nodes and distributor nodes, and () is 
the number of generator-distributor shortest paths passing though node k.  
The capacity of node k is assumed to be proportional to its initial node 
 with a network tolerance 
parameter α,  
 = (1 +  )
                                                              (2) 
The concept of the tolerance parameter α (α > 0) can be understood as an operating margin allowing 
safe operation of the component under potential load increment. The occurrence of a cascading failure 
is initiated by removal of a node, which in general changes the distribution of shortest paths. Then the 
load at a particular node can change and if it increases and exceeds its capacity, the corresponding 
node fails. Any failure leads to a new redistribution of loads and, as a result, subsequent failures can 
occur. It should be noted that the single failure mechanism applied here does not attempt to simulate a 
realistic trigger event of cascading failure; instead, it is only a manner of starting the cascading failure 
simulation for the ML model (and the OPA model introduced below). 
Using this cascading failure model, the vulnerability of network Q can be characterized by the fraction 
of network efficiency lost in the cascading failure: 
!"#($) = %(&)'%(&()%(&)                                                           (3) 
where Vul(Q)	∈ (0,1) and $(  represents the residual network structure after the initial failure. E(Q) 
measures the network efficiency based on the node pair shortest path distance between generators and 
distributors. For its computation all pairs of nodes i	∈ !*, and j	∈ !+ are weighted by the inverse of 
their distance: 
   ,($) = ∑ ∑ -(,)∈∈                                                           (4) 
where .(, ) is the number of edges for an unweighted network or the sum of edge weights for a 
weighted network in the shortest path from i to j.  
The geodesic vulnerability !"#($)  measures the functionality of a network when subjected to a 
contingency due to cascading link disruption with regard to its steady state (base case).  As !"#($) 
increases, the impact on the network due to cascading failure also increases, as some components 
become disrupted. !"#($) has been proved to be a well-defined index being capable of providing 
results consistent with those of physical model indices (26). 
The detailed simulation of the ML cascading failure model proceeds as follows: 
Step 1. Apply equation (1) to compute the initial load of each node for a proposed network by Floyd’s 
shortest paths algorithm (31) and calculate the capacity of each node based on equation (2).  
Step 2. Trigger the initial failure. In the optimization, one of the top five most loaded nodes is chosen 
as failed and, thus, is removed from the network.  
Step 3. Recur to equation (1) and Floyd’s shortest paths algorithm to recalculate the load of each 
working node in the network. 
Step 4. Test each node for failure: for each node k (k	∈ ) of the network, if 
 >  then node k is 
regarded as failed and, thus, is removed from the network. 
Step 5. If any working node fails, return back to step 3. Otherwise, terminate the cascading simulation 
and evaluate the vulnerability of the network using equation (3). 
Complex network theory models, such as the ML that we use within our optimization framework in 
Section 3, have no direct physical relation to the mechanisms of realistic power grids, but they have 
the key advantage that by utilizing techniques from graph theory they can be applied to analyze large-
scale networks. For this reason, this modelling approach is seeing increasing applications for 
modelling cascading failure processes in power grids. 
2.2. The OPA model 
The OPA model has been proposed by researchers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Power 
System Engineering Research Center of Wisconsin University (PSerc), and Alaska University (Alaska) 
(10-12)
. The OPA model is built upon the Self-Organized Criticality (SOC) theory, contains two 
interdependent time scale dynamics, i.e., fast power flow dispatching dynamics and slow power grid 
growth dynamics, and describes the complexity and criticality of power systems. The slow time scale 
dynamics describes how the system evolves as demand changes over longer timeframes (e.g., over 
days), and subsequent system upgrades in response to demand vary and blackouts. On the other hand, 
the fast time scale dynamics depicts cascading failures of transmission lines over very short time (e.g., 
over seconds) during the slow dynamics. It is a novel and powerful tool for analyzing power systems. 
Our analyses focus on the fast power flow dynamics, in order to ensure comparability with the ML 
model shortest path assumption. 
The cascading failure model is based on the standard DC power flow equation, 
F = AP                                                                           (5) 
where F is a vector whose NE components are the power flows through the lines, Fij (NE is the total 
number of links in the network), P is a vector whose N-1 components are the power injection of each 
node, Pi (N is the total number of nodes in the network), with the exception of the reference generator, 
P0, and A is a constant matrix that depends on the network structure and impedances (see Ref. (11) for 
details about the computation of A). The reference generator power is not included in the vector P to 
avoid singularity of A as a consequence of the overall power balance. 
The generator power dispatch is solved using standard linear programming methods. Using the input 
power demand, the power flow equation (5) is solved with the condition of minimizing the following 
cost function: 
  012 = ∑ 3(2)∈ + 4∑ 3(2)∈                                              (6) 
where VG and VD are the sets of generators and distributors, respectively. This definition gives 
preference to generation shift whilst assigning a high cost (set K = 100) to load shedding, and it is 
assumed that all generators operate at the same cost and that all loads are served with equal priority. 
The minimization is done with the following constraints: 
(1) Generator power injections are generally positive and limited by installed capacity limits: 0 ≤ 3 ≤ 3678,  ∈ !*. 
(2) Loads always have negative power injections:	3-96 ≤ 3 ≤ 0,  ∈ !+. 
(3) The absolute flow through links is limited by link capacities: :;: ≤ ;678. 
(4) Total power generation and consumption remain balanced: ∑ 3 = 0∈∪ . 
After solving the linear optimization by using the simplex method as implemented in Ref. (32), we 
examine which lines are overloaded. A line is considered to be overloaded if the power flow through it 
is within 1% of the limit capacity ;678. Each overloaded line may outage with probability = (= is set 
as 1 in the case study to ensure its comparability with ML). If an overloaded line experiences an 
outage, its power flow limit ;678 is divided by a very large number  to ensure that practically no 
power may flow through the line. This action can avoid the infeasibility of the power flow 
optimization stem from topological islands of the system by removing the component directly. Besides, 
to avoid a matrix singularity from the line outage, the impedances of failed lines are multiplied by a 
large number >, resulting in changes of the network matrix A.  
Load shedding is utilized to quantify the damage of the cascading failure. For an individual node, load 
shedding is defined as the difference between its power injection and demand: 
? = 3-96 − 3                                                           (7) 
Subsequently, total load shedding for the system is: 
? = ∑ ?∈                                                                (8) 
Finally, system load shedding is normalized by its total demand D and used as a measure of cascading 
vulnerability: 
? AB = ∑ C∈D∑ EFGH∈D                                                            (9)                          
The fact that simulation results from OPA model are consistent with historical blackout data for real 
power systems has justified its effectiveness (12). However, the applications of OPA have generally 
been limited to networks with a relatively small number of nodes compared to real power grids (24), 
due to the computational efforts involved.  
3 OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
For a given network, cascading failure resilience could be enhanced in many ways. In this paper, we 
focus on choosing the connecting patterns between generators and distributors of a realistic power 
transmission network, so as to optimize resilience to cascading failures. In this study, system 
vulnerability to cascading failure (i.e. system functionality loss in cascading failure) is regarded as a 
reverse measure of system resilience: the less the functionality loss, the higher the system resilience. 
Given the goal of analyzing a realistic-size network, the ML cascading failure model is used to 
evaluate the resilience of a pattern of connections. By associating a cost to each link posed in the 
network, the optimization also seeks to minimize the total cost. 
The network is modeled as a weighted graph, in which the edge weights are given by their physical 
distances which we assume directly related to the transmitting cost of the link. We define the variables 
to be optimized as the links of generation nodes to the different distribution nodes: 
                                                   I = J1, if		is	connected	with		directly0, otherwise                              (10) 
for all  ∈ !* and  ∈ !+. Two constraints have to be met when rewiring generators and distributors: (1) 
each distributor node is required to connect with at least one generator node or other distributor node, 
to make it accessible to the power supplying generators; (2) each generator node has to connect at least 
with one distributor node. 
We assume that the cost associated with each connection cutting and rewiring is linearly proportional 
to the physical length of the linkage, with coefficient φ. The total investment cost of a reconstructed 
pattern I	in the power transmission network can be defined as 
  = ∑ YI∈∈ .(, )                                                          (11) 
where .(, ) is the physical distance between i and j. 
The cascading failure resilience of each reconstructed pattern I can be quantified by the vulnerability 
of the new network, given by equation (3). It should be noted that the effect of the type of initial event 
could significantly influence the cascading failure result: the efficiency loss of a cascade triggered by 
the failure of a critical component could be much more severe than that originated by the failure of a 
normal component. Therefore, we consider a worst-case scenario in this study by choosing the failure 
of one of the top five most loaded nodes as initial failure in each cascade process simulation and, then, 
the results are averaged on the number of simulations. 
Through the quantification of the connection pattern cost and cascading failure vulnerability, the 
facility allocation problem is formulated as a multi-objective optimization problem: 
Zmin\I]																																																													(12_)min!"# `$ab																																																					(12c)	  
1. 2. e∑ I∈∪ > 0	∀ ∈ !+																																			(12g)∑ I∈ > 0	∀ ∈ !* 																																										(12.)	   
The objective function (12a) is the sum of the fixed rewiring costs; (12b) expresses the resilience 
objective. The two constraints mentioned above are enforced by formulas (12c) and (12d), respectively. 
Observe that the least costly generator allocation is simply that with no links among facilities and 
consumers. 
In our work, the multi-objective optimization problem (12a) – (12d) is tackled by the Non-dominated 
Sorting Binary Differential Evolution (NSBDE) algorithm presented in the next Section 4. 
4 NON-DOMINATED SORTING BINARY DIFFERENTIAL 
EVOLUTION ALGORITHM FOR TOPOLOGY OPTIMIZATION 
In this section, the operative procedures of the Non-dominated Sorting Binary Differential Evolution 
(NSBDE) algorithm are proposed for solving the multi-objective optimization problem introduced in 
Section 3 above. The starting point is the standard Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm, initially 
proposed as a population-based global optimization method for real-valued optimization problems, 
which has been found to outperform other optimization algorithms in various applications (21, 33, 34). In 
order to solve the combinatorial multi-objective problem of interest, the fast non-dominated sorting, 
ranking and elitism techniques used in non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm-II (NSGA-II) (35) are 
introduced into a modified binary differential evolution (MBDE), which is a binary version of DE 
developed to tackle single-objective binary-coded optimization problems (36). The NSBDE proceeds as 
follows: (21) 
Step 1. Initialization of parameters 
Set the values of the population size NP, the crossover rate CR, the scaling factor F, and the maximum 
generations Nmax. 
Step 2. Generation of initial population and evaluation 
Initialize each individual in the population which is represented as a bit-string and denoted as =hi ={=hi , |=hi ∈ {0,1l;  = 1,2, … ,3,  = 1,2,… ,ol , where NP is the population size and M is the 
dimensionality of the solutions. Each individual is also called a chromosome and forms a candidate 
solution to the problem. Each bit of each initial chromosome takes a value from the set {0, 1} with 
probability equals to 0.5: the bit takes ‘1’ if the corresponding generator node and distributor node are 
connected, ‘0’ otherwise. 
Each of the NP chromosomes is evaluated by computing the two objective functions, i.e. formula (12a) 
and (12b). 
Step 3. Generation of trial population 
Apply the binary tournament selection operator (35) to the population 3Ii to generate a trial population 3!i, which undergoes the evolution operations of mutation and crossover. 
Step 3.1 Mutation 
The following probability estimation operator P(px) is utilized to generate the mutated individuals 
according to the information of the parent population: 
3\=hi ] = p9qrs[uvwx,y z{`uvwr,y quvw|,y bq}.~]xzr{                                (13) 
where b is a positive real constant, usually set as 6; F is the scaling factor; =h,i , =h>,i  and =h,i  
are the j-th bits of three randomly chosen individuals at generation t. According to the probability 
estimation vector 3\=hi] = [=h,i , =h,>i , …  =h,i ]  created by equation (13), the corresponding 
offspring ="i of the current target individual =hi is generated as equation (14). 
="i = J1, if	_. ≤ 3(=hi )0, otherwise                                                         
 
(14) 
where rand is a uniformly distributed random number within the interval [0,1]. 
Step 3.2 Crossover 
The crossover operator is used to mix the target individual and its mutated individual. The trial 
individual =i = (=,i , =,>i , … =,i ) can be obtained by the crossover operator as follows, 
=i = ="i , if	_. ≤ 	or	 = _.=hi , otherwise 	                                     (15) 
where randj	∈ (0,1] is a uniform random value, CR is the crossover rate, and randi is a uniform 
discrete random number in the set {1, 2, ..., NP}. 
Step 4. Evaluation 
Evaluate each of the NP chromosomes in the population 3!i by computing its rewiring cost (12a) and 
resilience to cascading failures (12b) by performing the ML cascade process simulation procedure 
presented in Section 2.2.  
Step 5. Union and Sorting 
Combine the parent and trial populations to obtain a union population 3i = 	3Ii ∪ 3!i. Rank the 
individuals in the union population by the fast non-dominated sorting algorithm (33) with respect to the 
objective values, and identify the ranked non-dominated fronts F1, F2, …, Fk where F1 is the best front, 
F2 is the second best front and Fk the least good front. 
Step 6. Selection 
Select the first NP individuals from 3i  to create a new parent population 3Iip. The crowding 
distance is used in this step to choose the individuals with the same front, where crowing refers to the 
density of solution present in a neighborhood of an individual of specified radius (35): we prefer the 
individual which is located in a region with least number of individuals. The algorithm stops when it 
reaches the predefined maximum generations Nmax.   
5 CASE STUDY AND RESULTS ANALYSIS   
5.1. Case study and parameters setting 
In this paper, the 400kV French power transmission network (FPTN400) (Figure 1) is taken for 
exemplification of the proposed approach. The network is built from the data on the 400 kV 
transmission lines of the RTE website (37). It has 171 nodes (substations) and 220 edges (transmission 
lines). We distinguish the generators, which are the source of power, from the other distribution 
substations, that receive power and transmit it to other substations or distribute it in local distribution 
grids. By obtaining the power plants list from EDF website (38) and relating them with the ID of the 
buses in the transmission network, we have 26 generators and 145 distributors. Only the nuclear power 
plants, hydroelectric plants and thermal power plants whose installed capacities are larger than 1000 
MW, are considered. 
For reallocation of the power generating nodes to the other nodes, the NSBDE algorithm introduced in 
the previous section is applied. The parameters values used to run the NSBDE algorithm are reported 
in Table I. The tuning parameters are chosen based on trial-and-improvement for fast convergence of 
the algorithm (28). The network tolerance parameter α is set to 0.3 to simulate the normal operating 
condition; linkage cost parameter φ is set to 1. 
 Fig. 1.  The 400kV French power transmission network (FPTN400) (37) 
At the beginning of the simulation, all 55 links among generators and distributors in the FPTN400 are 
cut off. The population is initialized by randomly assigning 0 or 1 to each bit of each chromosome in 
the population, forming a group of potential rewiring solutions. For evaluating the cascading 
vulnerability of a given generators-distributors allocation pattern, the ML cascading failure model is 
run starting from failing one of the top five most loaded (largest betweenness) nodes in repeated 
cascading simulations at the end of which the vulnerability values are averaged. 
Table I .  Parameters of the NSBDE algorithm 
Parameters Values 
Population size NP 25 
Dimensionality of solution M 3770 
Crossover rate CR 0.9 
Scaling factor F 0.2 
Maximum generation Nmax 300 
 
 
5.2. Topological optimization results 
Figure 2 reports the convergence plots of one run of the NSBDE algorithm. The top and bottom panels 
show the two optimal solutions with regard to the two objectives (12a) and (12b), respectively. It is 
observed that the algorithm is able to converge after around 150 generations. 
 Fig. 2.  Convergence plots of objective functions (12a) (top) and (12b) (bottom) during the evolution of NSBDE 
 
Fig. 3.  Pareto front reached by a population of 25 chromosomes evolving for 300 generations 
The Pareto front obtained by the NSBDE algorithm at convergence is illustrated in Figure 3. The 
diamond point in Figure 3 represents the current network with the present pattern of connecting links, 
which is also the least costly network; the square point is the most resilient network, whose cascading 
vulnerability is 0.184. It is not unexpected that the original network is the least costly one, since the 
electrical transmission lines and substations are placed with geographical constraints and connections 
between two distant substations are avoided. Actually, cost-effectiveness is a major consideration in 
constructing real power transmission networks. 
 Fig. 4.  Comparison of the cascading vulnerability between the original and the most resilient networks under 
different network tolerance values 
It is also noted from Figure 3 that the cascading failure resilience of the FPTN400 can be improved 
significantly by properly rewiring the generator-distributor connections, though at a cost; the network 
vulnerability is decreased from 0.728 to 0.184 (when α=1.3) with an increased cost of 7.3 × 10 (i.e., 
53.16 times increase). Figure 4 reports the cascading vulnerability comparison between the original 
network and the most resilient one (Pareto solution #17) with different tolerance parameters. It shows 
that when the network tolerance is very low, i.e. 0<  < 0.1, the optimized network loses most of its 
efficiency, i.e., it is quite vulnerable to intentional attacks possibly due to its intensive loading 
condition. However, when α≥0.3 (which is generally the normal operating condition (13)), the 
optimized network loses less than 20% of its efficiency during a cascading failure initiated by 
intentional attack.  
Albeit a substantial improvement of the cascading failure resilience of the FPTN400 is possible by 
adding redundant links, a tradeoff between the cost and resilience improvement is necessary for 
rational decision-making. Along the Pareto frontier of the potential solutions, there are some points at 
which a small sacrifice of cost gives a large gain of cascading resilience. More generally, by taking a 
network solution and its neighbor on the frontier (the less costly one), one can define a rate of change 
of cascading resilience with respect to cost: |∆!"#/∆g012|. This rate can be utilized as a reference to 
choose the optimized network: the larger the ratio, the more preferred the network is.  
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 Fig. 5.  The topology of the Pareto solution #3 and its difference with the original network 
Figure 5 reports the topology of the network corresponding to the Pareto solution #3 (310.6, 0.59) 
whose |∆!"#/∆g012| value is comparatively large. The bold links represent the 10 added connections 
with respect to the original real network: notice that only 10 links are required to be rewired for the 
original network to gain a 19.2% cascading resilience improvement (the cascading vulnerability is 
decreased from 0.73 to 0.59). Besides, it is noted from Figure 5 that the newly added links tend to 
connect distant generator and distributor pairs, indicating that the installation of power lines between 
remote power substations can improve the resilience of the system, although at larger costs.  
5.3. Validation by the OPA model 
All the optimization results presented in the previous section are based on the ML model which 
abstracts basic power flow constraints and electrical characteristics of the power transmission network. 
In this section, the more realistic OPA model introduced in Section 2.2 is utilized to verify the optimal 
results found. 
The verification is not straightforward due to the differences of the two models in the way of 
representing system capacity, in the iterative algorithms they rely on, and in the way of measuring the 
damage produced by the cascading failure. Accordingly, some assumptions and adjustments to the 
OPA model (as described in Section 5.3.1) are necessary to ensure its applicability to assess the 
optimization solutions obtained based on the ML model (27). 
5.3.1 OPA Adjustments 
Five representative solutions (i.e., the least cost network FPTN400, the Pareto solution #17 (7300, 
0.184) which is the most resilient, together with the solutions #3 (310.6, 0.59), #5 (3344.3, 0.28) and 
#13 (1003.8, 0.48) whose |∆!"#/∆g012| values are comparatively large) along the Pareto front are 
chosen as the basic network topologies to be verified by the OPA model. To facilitate comparability 
with the ML model, all the generators are assumed to have equal capacity, and all the loads are 
assumed to have equal constant demand (we use 26, i.e. the number of generators in the simulation). 
Furthermore, all edge impedances are calculated using the typical reactance value 0.28 ohm/km at 50 
Hz (39). This heterogeneous impedance setting aligns with the weighted edge initialization in the ML 
model. 
The ML model uses the parameter α to represent network tolerance, while regarding the OPA model, 
prior studies set the initial limits (demand, generator capacity, line flow limits) by evolving the 
network using combined fast-slow dynamics until the network reaches a steady state (11). Considering 
that we limit the scope of the OPA evaluation to fast dynamics, we use a simpler initialization strategy 
(proposed by Cupac et al. (27)) which does not require the slow power grid growth dynamics, and apply 
the parallel capacity setting (the   model) to facilitate the comparison. In particular, the values of the 
initial flows ;(0)  and of the link capacities ;678  are determined as follows: demand for all 
distributor nodes is fixed to a constant amount, as mention above, and total generation capacity is set 
to be equal to total demand, and equally divided among the generators. Then, the power flows along 
the lines are estimated by assuming that every distributor node would obtain an equal amount of power 
from every generator. The initial flows are calculated by selecting a generator (one at a time), setting 
all other generator capacities to 0 and then computing power flows to each distributor node. The sum 
of the power flows over all the generators results in the estimated initial flow along each link, ;(0). 
Analogous to the initialization process in the ML model, the maximum capacity for a link connecting 
nodes i and j is given by 
;
678 = (1 +  ):;(0):                                                       (16) 
It is noted that the values of the initial flows ;(0) are only used to set the link flow capacities ;678 
in such a way that they are comparable to the capacities  used by the ML model. The network 
tolerance parameter is set to	0 ≤  ≤ 2 in our approach, parallel to the ML model, representing excess 
transmission capacity. Then, the node transmission capacity is modelled as the sum of link flow 
capacities of adjacent links ∑ ;678∈  where ! is the set of nodes directly connected to node i. 
In the OPA implementation, the probability of an overloaded link is set to = = 1 (identical with that 
in Cupac et al. (27)), to ensure comparability with ML, where an overloaded node fails and is removed 
from the network with certainty. This setting will not change the OPA validation results where only 
the relative ranking of cascade vulnerability for each network is considered, although it has probably 
changed all the absolute values of cascade vulnerability. Besides, we initiate the cascade in the same 
manner that we do in the ML model, as stated in Section 3. 
5.3.2 Validation Results 
Figure 6 reports the landscapes of the node transmission capacities   and ;678  under both ML 
model and OPA model, respectively, for the five chosen networks (with  = 0). It shows that node 
capacities in ML are highly correlated with node capacities in OPA model for the FPTN400, Pareto 
solution #3, #5 and #13 (actually, the correlation coefficients are 0.904, 0.890, 0.862 and 0.914 
respectively); for Pareto solution #17, the linear correlation of node transmission capacities still exists 
(with correlation coefficient 0.619). This indicates that the initialization strategy is consistent for ML 
and OPA models: nodes with high capacity in ML tend to have high capacity in OPA, and nodes with 
low capacity in ML also tend to have low capacity in OPA (27).   
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(c)
R(ML, OPA) = 0.619
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(d)
R(ML, OPA) = 0.862
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Fig. 6.  Scatterplot of normalized node transmission capacity in ML versus OPA model using, (a) the original 
FPTN400; (b) Pareto solution #3 network; (c) Pareto solution #17 network; (d) Pareto solution #5; (e) Pareto 
solution #13. Node transmission capacity in OPA is highly correlated with transmission capacity in ML, the 
correlation coefficient are 0.904, 0.890, 0.619, 0.862 and 0.914 for the five networks, respectively. The solid 
lines represent the best fits. 
 
In Figure 7, we plot the curves of normalized load shedding ?/A versus network tolerance α obtained 
by applying the OPA model to the five representative networks selected from the Pareto front. The 
OPA simulation is triggered by removing one of the top five most loaded nodes (i.e., targeted initial 
failure). Analogous to the ML model (Figure 4), the network damages decreases when network 
tolerance increases for all the networks. When network tolerance value is high enough ( > 1.2), any 
small intentional disturbance on the network would tend to cause quite low damage to the functioning 
of the network (< 1%). Most importantly, it is observed that in the OPA simulation, the network 
corresponding to Pareto solution #3 (310.6, 0.59) (green triangle curve) is more resilient, i.e., it 
presents less load shedding than the original network (red circle curve) over a wide range of network 
tolerance α (i.e., 0 <  < 1.2); in addition, solution #13 (1003.8, 0.48) (magenta diamond curve) 
generally outperforms the solution #3, while solution #5 (3344.3, 0.28) (grey star curve) outperforms 
#13 in terms of cascade resilience. Finally, Pareto solution #17 (7300, 0.184) (which is the most 
resilient network according to the ML model) presents the lowest load shedding among the five 
networks over the entire range of α values considered. This ranking of cascading failure resilience is 
consistent with the simulation results based on ML model.  
Figure 8 shows the results of OPA simulation on the five networks, where the failures are triggered by 
removing a randomly chosen node (i.e., random initial failure) and the results are averaged over 30 
different samples. The ranking of cascade resilience of the five networks here is also parallel with the 
optimization results based on ML. This demonstrates that a resilience-improved network from the 
optimization based on the ML model is also more resilient than another one if evaluated by 
the more realistic OPA cascade simulation, therefore, verifying that the insights gained by the 
topological optimization approach are valid. 
 Fig. 7.  Cascading vulnerability (normalized load shedding) evaluated by the OPA model for the five chosen 
networks over a range of network tolerance values α under targeted initial failure. 
 
Fig. 8. Cascading vulnerability (normalized load shedding) evaluated by the OPA model for the five chosen 
networks over a range of network tolerance values α under random initial failure. The results have been averaged 
over 30 different samples. 
Also important is to remember that the results produced by the simple ML topological model are 
obtained at a much lower computational cost than those of the OPA model: actually, the average time 
needed to carry out a single cascading failure simulation is 3.9s and 20.8s for the ML and OPA models, 
respectively, on a double 2.4 GHz Intel CPU and 4 GB RAM computer. 
6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Generally, the structure of power grids emerges through an unplanned growth process to meet service 
demand and/or results from optimization of costs. However, the increasing threat of large scale 
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failures, albeit infrequent, makes it vital to think of the design of resilient network systems capable to 
resist against and recover from cascading failures.  
In this paper, we have investigated the allocation of generators to distributor nodes by rewiring links 
under the objectives of maximizing the network cascading failure resilience and minimizing the 
investment costs.  
In realistic cases of networks of large number of nodes, the problem is a combinatorial multi-objective 
optimization problem. To effectively tackle the problem, we have proposed a NSBDE multi-objective 
algorithm, within a Pareto optimality scheme of search for non-dominated solutions. To simulate and 
quantify the cascading failure resilience of network connection solutions selected during the NSBDE 
search, a complex network model – namely, the Motter-Lai (ML) model ‒ has been used, to exploit is 
rapidity of calculation.  
Exemplification has been done by considering the 400kV French power transmission network 
(FPTN400). The results of the case study have shown that generator-distributor allocation can be 
optimized to improve the cascading resilience of a realistic power transmission network system at an 
acceptable cost. 
To validate the physical significance of the topological optimization results, a detailed and more 
realistic power flow model ‒ i.e., the ORNL-Pserc-Alaska (OPA) model ‒ has been considered. The 
OPA model has been applied to five network topologies selected from the Pareto front found by the 
topological optimization process. The ranking of the five selected networks with respect to their 
vulnerability to both intentional attacks and random failure is consistent with that of the ML model; in 
addition, the computational time required by the ML approach is shown to be 5.5 times lower than that 
of the OPA approach. This verifies (i) the physical meaningfulness of the topological optimization 
solutions and (ii) the practical usefulness of abstract cascading models in network optimization tasks.  
It is noted that this consistency is not insignificant since it demonstrates that one resilience-improved 
pattern of capacity allocation optimized by the ML model is also of higher resilience if measured by 
the more realistic OPA model, providing impetus for the use of topological, complex network theory 
models for ensemble analysis and optimization of large infrastructures against cascading failure with 
the advantages of simplicity, scalability and low computational cost (e.g., future studies may consider 
using complex network cascading models to optimize both the topology and electrical/reliability 
properties of realistic power networks, which may enable unraveling questions such as which type of 
resource distribution is the most favorable for a network to resist to cascading failure, when the total 
resource is limited). 
The initialization strategy of the OPA model in this paper ensures that we can use the network 
tolerance parameter α as a common measure of transmission capacity for both models. However, the 
actual data could be used in the OPA validation if they are initially applied in the optimization based 
on the ML model, and if they are available. This could be possible future work. Besides, performing 
optimizations using directly detailed and computationally intensive power flow models (e.g., embrace 
Newton Raphson based power flow approaches (45) and/or realistic trigger event such as natural hazard 
and malevolent targeted disruption (46), into the cascade modelling framework) would enable a more 
thorough and comprehensive comparison of the two classes of approaches considered in this paper. 
Furthermore, it may be useful to model variations in generation capacity and to consider situations 
where generation capacity and demand are not equally distributed, which is aligned with more realistic 
cases of power grids. Finally, while being relatively small compared to real scenarios with thousand 
buses due to computational constraints and data availability, the proposed network is sufficient to 
illustrate the usefulness of the topological optimization methodology in this study. Nevertheless, we 
believe that application of the topological approach to large-scale networks is interesting and this falls 
perfectly within the scope of our future research in this direction. 
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